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5. A framework for mobile handset detection 
 
Neil Croft 





Due to the increase in social media and mobile media in general, access to these platforms from a 
number of different mobile devices must be catered for. Mobile Device Detection (MDD) refers 
to software that identifies the type of mobile device visiting the mobile web and either redirects 
the end user to a dedicated mobile web site or adapts the rendered output from a web server to best 
suit the capabilities of the end user's mobile device. Furthermore, handset credentials are, in some 
cases, used for the purpose of correctly identifying the mobile operating system, which in turn is 
used to redirect to a mobile application download.  
 
In any web server request, identification of the user is transmitted in a header field known as the 
User-Agent (UA). Identifiable information present in the request header allows for unique browser 
identification and the device used in making the request for a web page. A lookup table, comprising 
of the all known handset capabilities, is the core functionality of a MDD.   
 
Our aim in this paper is to survey the distribution of mobile User-Agents so as to establish an 
attribution of mobile browsing detections. In particular, assessing details of mobile User-Agents, 
proxy requests (intermediary for requests from users seeking resources from other servers), 
emulated requests (software program that imitates a real handset), perpetuates our ability to census 
mobile traffic with some degree of accuracy. The approach is to make use of a sample set of real-
world mobile aggregated requests. We will analyze and filter these requests by origin, User-Agent, 
geo-location and sometimes non-industry standard (inserted by mobile network operators, which 
might contain personally identifiable information) to build our mobile browsing framework. In 
doing so, we encompass description, identification, nomenclature, and classification of end user 
mobile handset detections. Finally, we will investigate the significance of our framework to see 
how unique requests are given nothing other than identifiable browser information. 
 
Keywords 
Mobile, handset detection, WURFL, User-Agent, framework. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
With the growing number of mobile Internet-enabled devices in use, providing a usable mobile 
website or application is more important than ever; but you cannot achieve this without mobile 
device detection software. This is mainly due to the Device Fragmentation (Wong 2012, Shevchik 
2013) or Device Diversity problem that exists today. There are a seemingly infinite number of 
mobile device configurations in the market today, wreaking havoc on developers and marketers 
alike. New handsets are released almost daily into new and existing markets with the same or 
similar configurations. Handset manufacturers and vendors alike rush to launch new handset into 
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the market before their competitors do, exclusive deals are sometimes signed with network 
operators further adding to the device fragmentation problem.  
 
The driving force behind device fragmentation is due to users choosing different devices with 
different functionalities for different reasons (price, phone bundle/basket etc.). So, if there is a way 
to use these dissimilarities (and sometimes similarities) to partition an audience and design a 
mobile offering for the various use-segments, then ultimately a better and more relevant experience 
is provided to the device user. Taking advantage of the differences is where device fragmentation 
transforms into market segmentation and could spell greater success for a mobile marketing 
campaign. Providers of mobile device detection software are continually updating their Device 
Description Repository (DDR) as the relevance, accuracy, interoperability, availability and speed 
of handset detection is paramount. The Device Description Repository (DDR) is a concept 
proposed by the Mobile Web Initiative Device Description Working Group (DDWG) of the World 
Wide Web Consortium (Smith et al. 2007). 
 
The DDR is supported by a standard interface and a core vocabulary and data structure of handset 
capabilities. Implementations of a DDR are expected to contain information about both mobile 
devices and web browsers (whether pre-installed or downloaded). If the DDR is not continually 
updated (with accurate information), the percentage of correct identification is significantly 
reduced, in which case a number of inaccurate assumptions are made (assuming identity based on 
a ``similar'' device from the same manufacturer). Providers of mobile device detection software as 
a service; capture and log all requests, for each device detection. This aids in maintaining a current 
device repository through the identification of any unidentifiable handsets detected.  
 
Just how much information can we extract from these requests? The information needed to perform 
such an analysis resides in each and every web request header received at a web server, and, later 
directed to the mobile device detection software. In saving, reading and matching header 
information to known devices, the service provider is able to accurately track and monitor trends 
in mobile activity, make predictions on future mobile trends, capture and analyse statistics and 
ultimately ascertain user mobile traffic. The result of the mobile traffic analysis contributes to the 
creation of a framework for mobile detections. The significance of which is demonstrated in the 
following example. Applications must detect fraud; however fraud detection tools available today 
that work in fixed-line computing environments do not necessarily translate to the mobile world. 
There are a number of methods that can be implemented to help detect fraud in the mobile 
environment, however these are still in the early stages of development and do not provide 
transparently across disparate mobile networks. If we begin with an analysis of extractable mobile 
request information we may only then begin to think of building framework for mobile detection, 
which may aid in fraud prevention. 
 
The aim of this paper is to focus on the cardinality and distribution of mobile User-Agents. In 
doing so, we are able to account for identifiable information present in web request headers. We 
consider the possibilities of proxy traffic, emulated traffic, and non-standard network-generated 
headers. This extracted information aids in the design of a framework for mobile handset 
detections. The methodology used is as follows: first we need a truly representative sample set 
from a distributed network capturing web request headers. Secondly we need to accurately extract 
and match handset information, interpret and comment on the results found. In doing so, we tend 
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towards (if our sample set is large enough) an accurate representation of the mobile web, based on 
a breakdown and analysis of distributed mobile requests. Statistical analysis is easier to extract in 
a traditional web-based environment. However, with the extent of mobile browsing and the need 
for accurately proving a specific device performed a specific web browsing action, we focus only 
on mobile browser requests. 
 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a background on the technologies and 
methods used in device identification with a focus on Wireless Uniform Resource Locator 
(WURFL). Our intension in Section 3 is to identify mobile devices by their User-Agents with exact 
matches only and exclude bot traffic (automated traffic) in order to provide an accurate reflection. 
In each case example mobile request headers are given. The significance of the results is used to 
create the proposed framework which is discussed in detail in Section 4. Possible uses of the 
framework include design principles in Next Generation Network (NGN) mobile security, privacy 




Unlike traditional desktop web browsing, there is a tremendous amount of fragmentation when it 
comes to mobile devices and their browsing. Markup can exist in any of the following standards: 
WML, HTML, HDML, cHTML, XHTML Mobile Profile, etc. (Saha et al. 2001. In comparison to 
a standard desktop web browser, a handset and its browsing capabilities will vary according to 
screen size, ability to support client side scripting, ability to support various image formats, etc. 
The response to a mobile browsing request is markup sent directly to the handset leaving no 
opportunity for the web server to adapt to browser limitations. This is compounded with the fact 
that software updates for mobile browsers are rare (Wurfl 2014) as mobile browsing software is 
pre-installed.  
 
In this section we cover User-Agents (UA), User-Agent Profiles (UAProf). We also investigate 
how WURFL uses and extracts device capabilities from these request headers and even serves 
them as back as part of the response (Passani 2012). Knowing what mobile request information is 
available is vital for the attribution (practice of attributing information to its source) of mobile 
browsing detection. In our case, attribution to the source is a requirement due to the construction 




When a user request is made to a publicly accessible web server, it often identifies itself, its 
application type, operating system, software vendor and revision, by submitting a characteristic 
identification string, also known technically as a User-Agent string. The User-Agent string format 
is currently specified by Section 14.43 of RFC 2616 (HTTP/1.1) (Fielding et al. 1999). The format 
of the User-Agent string in the HTTP protocol is a list of keywords with optional comments. For 
example if a handset manufacturer created a new Mobile Browser and call it ``MobileBrowser'', 
the User-Agent string might look as follows: MobileBrowser/1.0 Gecko/1.0, where 
``MobileBrowser/1.0'' indicates the name and revision and ``Gecko/1.0'' indicates the layout 
engine and revision. The User-Agent string is often used by web crawlers, also known as bots, for 
identification purposes to the webserver it communicates with. From a web server standpoint, this 
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traffic may be excluded from accessing certain parts of a web site using the Robots Exclusion 
Standard (Sun et al. 2007). This information usually resides in the root directory of the mobile site 
in a file called robots.txt and defines the handling of automated traffic. This aids in the 
identification of “real” traffic. At times it has been popular among mobile web developers to 
initiate User-Agent spoofing where the User-Agent string is manipulated on each web request 
made to a web server. Usually this is done during the testing phase of program development in 
order to test a programs outcome with various mobile device emulations. An example of a User-
Agent switcher is found in the Firefox browser as an add-on module (Di Stefano et al. 2002) which 
allows for User-Agent manipulation for the purpose of emulation. We do consider that as a result 
of User-Agent spoofing, collected statistics of mobile web browser usage may be inaccurate. 
However, due to the low number of such requests being initiated (and identified) we assume this 
to be negligible variable in the results. 
 
2.2 User-Agent Profile 
 
The UAProf (User-Agent Profile) specification is concerned with capturing capability and 
preference information for wireless devices (Quiroga et al. 2011). This information can be used by 
content providers to produce content in an appropriate format for the specific handset. This 
information is in the form of an XML document and usually covers the following device attributes: 
Hardware characteristics (screen size, multimedia capability, etc.); Software characteristics 
(operating system, etc.); Network characteristics (GSM/GPRS/3G/LTE capable); Browser 
characteristics (name, version, script support). 
 
Since it is not feasible for a handset to send all the information with each web request, the profiles 
are stored in publicly accessible repositories, thus a referral via a URL provides access to the 
UAProf for a particular handset. Theoretically, applications should be able to retrieve this profile 
programmatically and dynamically re-purpose the content for each device. However, practically, 
User-Agent Profiles (Quiroga et al. 2011) alone are not sufficient for handset detection. Some of 
the reasons include: UAProf profiles aren’t maintained and are often wrong, legacy handsets 
devices do not have a UAProf, UAProf are sometimes hosted at private URLs (only applications 
in the domain of a given operator have access to them), UAProf may not be legally re-host at a 
different URL and finally, companies such as Google and Microsoft decided to ignore UAProf on 
many devices. Thus a User-Agent string is the only reliable part of the web request header usable 
in handset identification. 
 
3. Wireless Uniform Resource Locator 
 
WURFL (Wireless Universal Resource FiLe), originally an open source effort, focused on mobile 
device detection. It quickly became the de facto standard open source (FOSS) framework for 
addressing Device Fragmentation or Device Diversity in mobile handsets. WURFL originally an 
XML configuration file (flat file) has been ported to many databases. It simply contains 
information about device capabilities and features for a variety of mobile devices (Hatem 2013). 
WURFL, a Device Description Repository (DDR), has a software component (written in just about 
every programming language) that maps web request headers to the profile of the user device 
(desktop, mobile handset, tablet, and recently even the smart TV). WURFL uses the User-Agent 
string passed along with each web request to a web server. WURFL constitutes a set of proprietary 
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application programming interfaces (APIs), which match and retrieve capabilities directly from 
the DDR file. WURFL may reside as a standalone program or sit in the cloud. Wherever the 
WURFL file is hosted it must be updated with the latest handsets and the over 500 device 
capabilities for each handset. A portion of WURFL is dedicated to achieving accuracy versus speed 
using a combination of caching techniques and repository optimisation. 
 
A combination of various capabilities (for example is_wireless_device, brand_name, 
model_name, mobile_browser, resolution_width, device_os) may be used by an application in a 
number of combinations. For example, a mobile advertising platform might need to know a 
handset's resolution width and touch screen capability in order to render the best suited advert back 
to a requesting handset. As a result of the continued growth of the WURFL file (new device 
information being added daily) a combination of novel techniques around caching, fall back device 
(if no accurate match is found) and even new browser inclusion (such as Opera Mini, Firefox 
mobile and Chrome mobile) have evolved. The extent to which the WURFL file has changed over 
the years is largely due to the introduction of these new mobile browsers and the complexities 
which arise from mobile network proxy traffic. For example, BlackBerry devices and Apple 
IPhone mobile traffic is proxy via the UK and USA respectively. WURFL has remained at the 
forefront of mobile detection and has evolved into an enterprise offering including products for 
mobile analytics, high-volume scalable detections. 
 
4. Framework for mobile handset detection 
 
Before beginning with any mobile data analysis and or comparisons of mobile user detections, we 
first need to understand our data environment and establish and define our sample data set. We 
begin by investigating the storage of the web browser request headers. 
 
4.1 The Data Environment 
 
The Data Environment includes a redundant network configuration whereby each and every web 
request header is saved to a flat file database. This aggregated data is generated across a 
distribution network and sources of the data include: proxies, web servers, mobile ad serving 
engines etc. The database used, in this case, is MongoDB (Chodorow 2013), an open source 
document-oriented NoSQL database system. MongoDB is a scalable, high-performance database 
which is part of the NoSQL family of database systems meaning that instead of storing data in 
tables as is done in a relational database, MongoDB stores structured data as documents with 
dynamic schemas. Using a NoSQL database makes the integration of and access to web browsing 
header information easier and faster than traditional relational databases.  
 
The web browser header data has been collected for a period of one year. Although new handset 
data is continually added to WURFL XML file, our aim is not to provide a detailed breakdown on 
an individual handset level but rather identify end-user mobile detection characteristics and 
ultimately the attribution of this information. Given the sample set is collected over a significant 
period of time, from various sources, the data tends towards a complete representation of all 
possible types of web and mobile browser requests. Due to the sensitivity of this data it was decided 
not to concentrate on the details of the data set but rather the interpretation of the distribution. It is 
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important to note, however, that a sample set size of 4 GB of web request headers was processed. 
It is the view of the author that his is a significantly large enough sample set size for the purpose 
of the research. 
 
4.2 High performance embedded handset detection in a web server 
 
Developers can retrieve a list of device capabilities by accessing a Device Description Repository 
(DDR) using a number of programming languages, including java, .NET, Perl, node.js etc. A 
number of solutions are available to a developer include: a cloud API (application program 
interface), a standalone program interface and an embedded C++ module plug-in for a number of 
web servers (including Apache and Nginx). Each implementation has its own benefits. For 
example, the cloud API uses the latest DDR but lacks in performance due to network lookup 
(Internet) latency issues. The standalone option suffers from a manual intervention by a developer 
in retrieving the latest DDR (a zipped archive) and installing it, however, it has significant 
performance improvements over the cloud solution. Lastly, the embedded web server plug-in is 
designed for high performance detections. Caching, taking common handsets and pre-loading their 
capabilities into the server’s memory, further enhances lookup speeds.  
 
For our tests, we deployed an Ubuntu 12.04 LTS server with an embedded WURFL module using 
an Nginx web server. To demonstrate this, a simple PHP script (phpinfo()) responds as part of the 
web browser header the detected handset (from the User-Agent string interpretation and lookup). 




produced the response shown in Figure 1. Notice the PHP Environment variables (returned from 
Nginx) includes handset information, for example: SERVER[WURFL_CAP_BRAND_NAME] 
 
 
Figure 1: PHP phpinfo() test page 
We ran our tests, taking MongoDB web request headers, running them against our high-
performance handset detection web server, to extract as much information as possible from the 
data set. Our main objective: to check the cardinality and distribution of mobile user agents. In 
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doing so, taking the results we are then able to work towards creating a framework for the 
attribution of mobile browsing detection. Listing 1 shows a basic example web browser request to 
a web server made from a BlackBerry handset: 
 
GET /dumprequest.php HTTP/1.1 
Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/png, */* 
Referer: http://www.google.com/ 
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (BlackBerry; U; BlackBerry 9700; pt) AppleWebKit/534.8+ (KHTML, like Gecko) 





Accept-Charset: iso-8859-1, *, utf-8 
...  
Listing 1: PHP dumprequest.php page 
 
We were able to categorise the request information as follows:  
 
4.2.1 Handset identification 
  
Using WURFL, we may extract the following information from the request as there is an exact 
match on the device lookup. A subsequent result may include (amongst other capabilities) the 
Manufacturer: RIM, Phone Model: BlackBerry 9700, Marketing Name: Bold, Mobile OS: RIM 
OS 6.0 and Screen Resolution: 480x360 resolution. 
 
4.2.2 IP Address Identification  
 
We may also use geo-location as a means to determine if mobile traffic originated at an IP address 
associated with a network service provider. We may use one or a combination of the following 
web browsing headers to extract the IP address from the request. 








We may map a list of known network proxy traffic to the IP address of the request and may 
conclude that any originating IP address, other than that present on the list, is emulated in nature.  
 




function get_ip_address_from_http_header () 
{ 
   foreach ( array (` HTTP_CLIENT_IP ', ` 
                               HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR ', ` 
                               HTTP_X_FORWARDED ', ` 
                               HTTP_X_CLUSTER_CLIENT_IP ', ` 
                               HTTP_FORWARDED_FOR ', ` 
                               HTTP_FORWARDED ', `REMOTE_ADDR ') 
   as $key ) { 
   if ( array_key_exists ($key , $_SERVER ) === true ) { 
      foreach ( explode (',', $_SERVER [$key ]) as $ip) { 
         $ip = trim ($ip); // to be safe 
         if ( filter_var ($ip , FILTER_VALIDATE_IP , 
                                      FILTER_FLAG_IPV4 | 
                                      FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | 
                                      FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE) !== false ) { 
            return $ip; 
         } 
      } 
   } 
   } 
} 
 
Listing 2: get_ip_address_from_http_header function 
 
4.2.3 Proxy Server Identification 
 
Opera Mini is a web browser designed primarily for mobile phones. Opera Mini is offered free of 
charge, supported mainly through deals with mobile operators to have Opera Mini pre-installed on 
their phones, and other sources of revenue such as search advertising deals, licensing and paid 
bookmarks. Opera Mini's is designed such that it requests web pages through its own Opera Mini 
servers, which process and compress them before sending them to the mobile phone, speeding up 
transfer by two to three times and dramatically reducing the amount of data transferred. This 
benefit is passed onto the user through data charge savings. The pre-processing increases 
compatibility with web pages not designed for mobile phones. 
 
As Opera Mini proxies all its traffic through its own servers, the originating web browser request 
is altered by the serving proxy. In most cases, the User-Agent string is altered as the request now 
originates from Opera Mini. An example of the User-Agent might now be: Opera/9.80 
(J2ME/MIDP; Opera Mini/9.80 (J2ME/22.478; U; en) Presto/2.5.25 Version/10.54. In other 
words, if we were now to make use of our DDR, the result returned would now include the 
following information: Mobile Browser: Opera Mini 1, Screen Resolution: 176x160 resolution. 
Proxies who alter the User-Agent string may include (as is the case with Opera Mini) a non-
standard web browser header which retains the originating User-Agent before the request reached 
the Proxy Server. Our web browser header might contain the following header: X-OperaMini-
Phone-Ua. We are able to use this header for our handset detection while knowing the web browser 
request was proxied via Opera Mini. 
 
4.2.4 MSISDN Identification 
 
An Access Point Name (APN) is the name of a gateway between a GPRS (or 3G, LTE etc.) 
(Dahlman et al. 2010) mobile network and another computer network, in most cases the public 
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Internet. A mobile device making a data connection must be configured with an APN to present to 
the network carrier. The carrier will then examine this identifier to determine what type of network 
connection should be created, for example: what IP addresses should be assigned to the wireless 
device, what security methods should be used, etc. A network carrier APN, in some instances, is 
configurable to pass through the mobile number (MSISDN) of the subscriber included in the web 
request. In doing so, the network carrier may violate the privacy of the subscriber; however this 
information might be the only truly uniquely identifiable information available, linking a 
subscriber to a mobile browser request. In some cases (APN dependent), the local 
Vodafone/Vodacom network carrier passed the MSISDN through as part of the web browser 
headers as follows: 
 HTTP\_X\_UP\_CALLING\_LINE\_ID 
 HTTP\_ X\_UP\_VODACOMGW\_SUBID 
 HTTP\_X\_MSISDN 
 
Listing 3 shows the PHP code snippet for the MSISDN extraction from the web browser header, 
given the presence of the non-standard web browser headers above. 
 
function get_msisdn_from_header (){ 
   $msisdn = `';// Vodafone 
   $msisdn = $_SERVER [`HTTP_X_UP_CALLING_LINE_ID ']; 
   if ( $msisdn == `'') { // Vodafone 
      $msisdn = $_SERVER [`HTTP_X_UP_VODACOMGW_SUBID ']; 
   } 
   if ( $msisdn == `') { 
      $msisdn = $_SERVER [` HTTP_X_MSISDN']; 
   } 
   return $msisdn ; 
} 
 
Listing 3: get_msisdn_from_header function 
 
As it may not always be possible to get a mobile device id number from its browser request, a 
possible solution is to generate a ``unique'' number (in our case, with php, we used the session_id() 
number mixed with a number generated with the rand() function) and then store it in a cookie that 
never expires (refer to Listing 4}. This is not a perfect solution, as it will not work if cookies are 
disabled or if the user clears his cookies, but mobile device mostly have cookies enabled, and the 








_pk_id.3.ba30=accd5838528bd401.1403338973.1.1403339119.1403338973.; _pk_ses.3.ba30=*; __atuvc=3%7C25 
 






4.3 Why a handset detection framework? 
 
Why are we concerned with mobile identification and building a framework? It is evident from 
such reports (Goredema 2012) that South Africa’s increased use of mobile phones, access to social 
media and Internet contribute to an increase in cybercrime. The scope of activities which could 
fall within the definition of mobile cybercrime is potentially broad, ranging from purely malicious 
or intimidation invasions of privacy, to the theft and abuse of personal identity particulars and the 
fraudulent manipulation of electronic data to commit fraud. If we do not consider to survey and 
structure a framework, we cannot begin to design a framework to combat fraud for example. 
 
In the previous section we spent some time performing a detailed extraction of web browsing 
request data. We detailed that on top of the web request lies the following: IP address extraction 
(proving a request was proxied through a legitimate network access point or third party), Proxy 
extraction (given the fact that some requests are proxied through third parties), Handset extraction 
(using a DDR to determine a generic device, partial find or fully detect) and then finally finding 
non-standard web browsing headers with information uniquely identifying the subscriber (e.g. 
MSISDN). The categorisation of the data lies in the presence of all of these identified components 
of a mobile request. Figure 2 illustrates our proposed handset detection taxonomy. The attribution 
extraction along with the network information is used by the framework in implementation of the 




Figure 2 Proposed Mobile Detection Taxonomy 
 
4.3.1 Framework analysis – a case example 
 
Using our framework, consider a crime is committed using a mobile device via a mobile browser. 
As an example, suppose a fraudulent insurance claim is made using this mobile device. In doing 




Furthermore, suppose the evidence is typed with standard and non-standard (some of which is 
uniquely identifiable) web browser header details. We consult the mobile detection taxonomy in 
order to prove the attribution of such an event's occurrence. In this case, it may be common to 
consider the match (conditional) probability 𝑃(𝐸 =  𝑎𝑏|𝑆 =  𝑎𝑏) under the hypothesis of 
innocence, where 𝐸 =  𝑎𝑏 and 𝑆 =  𝑎𝑏  means the evidence and the suspect have non-identifiable 
(or even partially identifiable) information, represented by a with identifiable information, 
represented by b provided in the web browser header(s). If we are to consider the product rule as 
a means to evaluate the match probability of a mobile user's mobile browsing profile then the 
above match probability is evaluated as follows: 
 
𝑃(𝑎𝑏|𝑎𝑏) = 2𝑝𝑎𝑝𝑏; 𝑎 ≠ 𝑏 
 
𝑃(𝑎𝑎|𝑎𝑎) =  𝑝𝑎
2 
 
where 𝑝𝑎 and 𝑝𝑏 are receptively the proportions of handsets browsing with web browser request 
header information ab in the defined population of requests. The population is determined from 
the statistical analysis of all browser requests, excluding bot traffic, of all mobile browser requests 
for a particular service. We may introduce a parameter to measure the uncertainty or likelihood 




In this paper, we assess details of web browsing requests in order to identify survey mobile traffic 
with some degree of accuracy. We made use of a set of real-world mobile aggregated requests 
analysing these using a DDR. We identified information that was identifiable and non-identifiable 
which lead to the building of our proposed mobile detection taxonomy. The taxonomy's 
categorisation of the data lies in the presence of IP address extraction, proxy extraction, Handset 
extraction all of which forms part of attribution extraction. The analysis thereof made use of match 
(conditional) probability in determining the likelihood the evidence and the having both non-
identifiable (or even partially identifiable) information together with identifiable information (of 
the subscriber). This paper shows the possibility of reaching a state of attribution of mobile handset 
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